I have been one acquainted and attracted by it. But without further ado, let me be just straightforward. While I am convinced that Islamic banking has been here to stay not only in Indonesia but also in the world, I also believe that unless more political support is rendered, its beauty will eat itself to maintain the current subsistence level. Islamic banking does need political support at an extent greater than or beyond what most scholars like Dawam Raharjo thinks. Rahardjo's excellent views, as traceable in some Islamic banking literature at home, have been based on historical accounts, going back to the struggle to establish the sharia in Nusantara. In a changing Indonesia, however, the arguments are insufficient. After Indonesia's Reformasi, the political constellation, players, and "rules of the game" in Indonesia has been so much altered with something resembling nothing that anyone knows of. The interplays of political forces and ensuing conflicts are something that neoliberalism has so far tended to ignore or belittle. Globally, the old political structure post the cold war, too, has crumbled. The world is increasingly becoming an unstable ground.
From philosophical perspectives, Islamic banking has yet to be capable of justifying itself that it is not merely a "newly-found" variant of banking as a discipline. Its banning of interest is indeed beautiful, but the fact that Islamic banks do resort to commercial interest rate in the determination of their own profits and in offering attractive shares for third party funds (TPFs) seems rather pitiably inconsistent. At the moment, I have been tempted to "surmise" that, until Islamic banking has a sharia-compliant yield curve of its own, and if this hedonic benchmarking is still used, Islamic banks are morally sanctioned to offer higher profit rates to tPFs while smaller shares of interest for themselves. Should this sound unattractive, part of the "untractiveness" for the banks' shareholders should be offset by the "purity" or tabarru' concepts designed for the hereafter. Besides, the banks can also play the mudharib part if they aspire for higher profits. I have been led into thinking this also because the ownership accountability of a great many Islamic banks has been an issue rarely addressed, unlike commercial banks. Individual shareholders are hardly if ever involved in decision making, because part of the chunks lies in the hand of ALCO meeting, the rest to the sharia board. Thus, the roles of more legitimate and more transparent Islamic banking managers and the national sharia jurists are critical for the success of Islamic banking, both as a discipline and as an institution. No room, really, for complacency.
